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Expert Mining and Required Disclosure 
Jonah B. Gelbach† 
INTRODUCTION 
In the social sciences, “data mining” sometimes refers pejo-
ratively to the repetitive use of classical statistical methods to 
find “evidence” that results from only random variation.1 Vari-
ous aspects of evidence and civil-procedure law disincentivize 
data mining by expert witnesses in federal civil litigation. But as 
many authors have noted through the years, resourceful attor-
neys can do data mining’s dirty work by hiring multiple experts, 
asking each to provide an expert report on the same issue, and 
then put on the stand only the one who provides the most favor-
able report.2 This practice is often referred to as “expert shop-
ping” or “witness shopping.”3 To emphasize its analogousness to 
data mining, though, I will use the term “expert mining.” 
Nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (jointly, “the Rules”) prevents expert 
 
 † Associate Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I thank Steve Bur-
bank, Richard Epstein, Anup Malani, David Marcus, Kathryn Spier, and Tobias Barring-
ton Wolff for helpful comments and suggestions. 
 1 For example, one might run many statistical models on the same data set, vary-
ing the included explanatory variables to find the greatest possible value of conventional 
test statistics, as Stata’s built-in “stepwise” command does automatically. See Stata 13 
Help for Stepwise, Stata (StataCorp LP 2013), online at http://www.stata.com/ 
help.cgi?stepwise (visited Mar 2, 2014). The term “data mining” has a more neutral 
meaning in other fields, especially computer science. See, for example, Wikipedia, Data 
Mining, online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_mining (visited Mar 2, 2014). Other 
terms sometimes used to distinguish the pejorative version include “data snooping,” see 
Halbert White, A Reality Check for Data Snooping, 68 Econometrica 1097, 1098 (2000), 
and “data dredging,” see Wikipedia, Data Dredging, online at http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Data_dredging (visited Mar 2, 2014). 
 2 See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis L Rev 1113, 1143; Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan L Rev 1477, 1541–42 
(1999); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness, 13 J 
Econ Persp 91, 98 (Spring 1999); Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 
NYU L Rev 174, 211 (2010). 
 3 See, for example, Posner, 51 Stan L Rev at 1541–42 (cited in note 2) (referring to 
“witness shopping”); Andrew MacGregor Smith, Note, Using Impartial Experts in Valua-
tions: A Forum-Specific Approach, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev 1241, 1247 (1994) (explaining 
“expert shopping”). 
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mining; what little case law exists is mixed.4 It is often observed 
that our adversarial system induces situations in which both 
sides predictably hire fancy experts who predictably testify to 
opposite effect.5 In part because of the tendency of trials to de-
volve into such a battle of the experts, many have argued that 
our system should at least make more use of court-appointed 
(and thus putatively neutral) experts, if not use them exclusive-
ly.6 However, there has been little use of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 706, which allows courts to use such experts, and there 
seems little likelihood of change on the horizon.7 
Judge Richard Posner has suggested a less sweeping solu-
tion to the specific problem of expert mining. Posner advocated 
requiring lawyers who call an expert witness “to disclose the 
name of all the experts whom they approached as possible wit-
nesses before settling on the one testifying. This would alert the 
jury to the problem of ‘witness shopping.’”8 Posner suggested 
that if one party’s testifying expert were the only one it hired, 
while the other party’s testifying expert were, say, its twentieth, 
then fact finders would be able to draw the “reasonable infer-
ence” that the latter’s case must be weaker (otherwise why hire 
so many experts?).9 Professor Christopher Robertson has pro-
posed a more substantial reform. His proposal is based on the 
double-blind matching of experts to litigants, but for my purposes 
 
 4 See discussion in notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
 5 See, for example, Gross, 1991 Wis L Rev at 1126–36 (cited in note 2). 
 6 This reform has a long record of support in the civil-procedure literature, espe-
cially among comparative-law scholars. See, for example, John H. Langbein, The German 
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U Chi L Rev 823, 835 (1985) (“In the Continental tradi-
tion experts are selected and commissioned by the court, although with great attention 
to safeguarding party interests. In the German system, experts are not even called wit-
nesses. They are thought of as ‘judges’ aides.’”). See also Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisi-
torial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the 
Adversarial, 90 Cornell L Rev 1181, 1215 (2005) (“[T]here is good reason to think that 
procedures relying exclusively on the parties to identify, present, and interpret the rele-
vant facts may be the least likely to arrive at the truth—certainly less likely than inquis-
itorial procedures that rely more on the court.”). 
 7 See, for example, Joe S. Cecil and Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed Experts: 
Defining the Role of Experts Appointed under Federal Rule of Evidence 706 *3 (Federal 
Judicial Center 1993), online at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/experts.pdf/$file 
/experts.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014). 
 8 Posner, 51 Stan L Rev at 1541 (cited in note 2). 
 9 Id.  
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its key feature is that it, too, relies on disclosure of the number 
of experts retained to eliminate expert mining.10 
My primary objective here is to assess disclosure’s ability to 
realize the promise of (i) inducing parties to acquire expert evi-
dence, while (ii) eliminating parties’ ability to obscure the in-
formative value of that evidence via expert mining. I argue that 
while required disclosure surely reduces the allure of expert min-
ing, it generally does not eliminate the use of multiple experts. I 
then point out that if we can count on parties to disclose truth-
fully, then a party’s use of expert mining is observable, so that a 
combined policy of required disclosure and exclusion of evidence 
obtained through expert mining would be feasible and would 
eliminate the incentive to use expert mining. But it is not obvi-
ous that such a combined disclosure-exclusion policy is desira-
ble.11 When coupled with required disclosure, “expert mining” is re-
ally just the reporting of evidence gathered from multiple experts. 
To the extent that additional fully disclosed expert testimony 
increases the fact finder’s information, we can expect a benefi-
cial increase in accuracy. On the other hand, expert evidence is 
costly; in addition, changes in its use could also change the pat-
tern of settlement and litigation, with potentially unpredictable 
effects on both the extent of litigation and primary behavior. Thus, 
I conclude that it is ex ante unclear whether disclosure-exclusion 
or just disclosure would be a better policy reform.12 
In Part I, I briefly discuss how the current Rules handle expert 
discovery and testimony. In Part II, I discuss the efficacy of re-
quired disclosure in a stylized example, showing that it does not 
generally eliminate incentives to expert mine. To eliminate expert 
mining requires that courts go further, excluding expert-mined 
 
 10 See Robertson, 85 NYU L Rev at 179–80 (cited in note 2). While Robertson’s ob-
jective is to provide a broader fix to more problems than just expert mining, I will focus 
on that aspect of his work. 
 11 This observation helps show how the Article links, at least heuristically, to the 
revelation-mechanism literature. We can think of parties’ “types,” as this term is used in 
the mechanism-design literature, see Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, Mech-
anism Design with Collusion and Correlation, 68 Econometrica 309, 312 (2000), as being 
given by the information they receive from the first-hired expert. A party that uses expert 
mining does so deliberately to obscure this type. We could prevent the parties from hid-
ing their types by refusing to admit any expert evidence, but that approach would throw 
the baby out with the bathwater. The combined disclosure-exclusion policy both elimi-
nates expert mining and induces parties to reveal their types. 
 12 On the possibility that increased accuracy might not be worth its costs, see Louis 
Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J Legal Stud 
307, 336 (1994). 
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testimony. In Part III, I discuss some Rules-based policy options 
that could be used to deter expert mining. I discuss some further 
considerations in Part IV, and then I conclude. 
I.  EXPERT WITNESSES AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require parties to disclose 
the identities of any experts they expect to testify at trial.13 Tes-
tifying expert witnesses generally must compose a written re-
port that will also be disclosed and that must include, inter alia, 
the expert’s opinions and their bases, as well as the facts and 
data that the expert considered.14 All of these disclosures must 
be made at least ninety days before the trial date (or such other 
date as the court determines),15 except that disclosures related to 
experts expected to testify to rebut the testimony of another par-
ty’s disclosed testifying expert can be made within thirty days of 
receiving that party’s disclosures.16 In addition, parties may take 
the deposition of opponents’ testifying experts.17 
Nontestifying experts are subject to almost no discovery. 
Rule 26(b)(4)(D) states: “Ordinarily, a party may not, by inter-
rogatories or deposition, discover facts known or opinions held 
by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by an-
other party . . . and who is not expected to be called as a witness 
at trial.”18 One exception involves medical examinations under 
Rule 35(b).19 A second requires “showing exceptional circum-
stances under which it is impracticable for the party to obtain 
facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.”20 Courts 
have debated what constitutes exceptional circumstances21 and al-
so whether Rule 26(b)(4)(D)’s “facts known or opinions held” lan-
guage shields identities of nontestifying experts.22 These issues 
 
 13 See FRCP 26(a)(2)(A). 
 14 See FRCP 26(a)(2)(B). 
 15 See FRCP 26(a)(2)(D)(i). 
 16 See FRCP 26(a)(2)(D)(ii). 
 17 See FRCP 26(b)(4)(A). 
 18 FRCP 26(b)(4)(D). 
 19 See FRCP 26(b)(4)(D) (stating that a party may take a deposition of a nontestify-
ing expert “(i) as provided in Rule 35(b)”). 
 20 FRCP 26(b)(4)(D)(ii). 
 21 Contrast Coates v AC & S, Inc, 133 FRD 109, 110 (ED La 1990) (holding that ex-
pert shopping constitutes exceptional circumstances), with Pickett v IBP, Inc, 2000 US 
Dist LEXIS 19500, *7–9 (MD Ala) (rejecting Coates). 
 22 See, for example, Ager v Jane C. Stormont Hospital & Training School for Nurses, 
622 F2d 496, 503–04 (10th Cir 1980); Hoover v United States Department of the Interior, 
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have not been addressed by the Supreme Court, and only a cou-
ple of courts of appeals have addressed them, so it is an open 
question whether the Rules as written allow discovery of nontes-
tifying experts’ identities. 
The policy basis for access to testifying experts is simple and 
deeply rooted in federal civil procedure: not only fair trials, but 
also just and accurate results, require that parties be informed 
of the key facts before trial commences.23 The policy rationale for 
shielding nontestifying experts from discovery—a shield that is 
now based in Rule 26(b)(4)—mirrors the two policy concerns that 
underlie Hickman v Taylor’s24 work-product doctrine.25 First, 
fairness and efficiency warrant extensive discovery rights for 
testifying experts. Second, allowing too much discovery of work 
product disincentivizes an attorney’s own diligent case prepara-
tion, with baleful effects on clients.26 
II.  INDIVIDUAL AND EXPERT MINING 
A. Individual Data Mining 
Individual data mining would involve an expert witness’s 
conducting whatever number of tests turned out to be necessary 
to obtain a result that supported the party hiring her, and then 
testifying regarding only the supportive test. Several features of 
the Rules discourage data mining. Testifying experts can be 
questioned during both deposition and trial testimony. If an ad-
versary discovers a party’s expert engaged in data mining, 
she could use the Federal Rules of Evidence to exclude the 
data-mined testimony. Data mining is not a “reliable . . . meth-
od[ ]” of testing for the level of a contaminant, so it fails Rule 
702(c).27 An expert who repeatedly conducts a reliable and prob-
abilistic test until she gets the desired result is not “reliably 
 
611 F2d 1132, 1146 (5th Cir 1980); Sea Colony, Inc v Continental Insurance Co, 63 FRD 
113, 114 (D Del 1974); Baki v B.F. Diamond Construction Co, 71 FRD 179, 182 (D Md 1976). 
 23 See, for example, Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, 
8A Federal Practice and Procedure § 2032 at 93 (West 3d ed 2013) (“Automatic access to 
at least some discovery regarding [testifying] experts was viewed as essential to enable 
the adverse party to prepare for effective cross–examination and rebuttal, as the Adviso-
ry Committee pointed out in its [1970] Note.”). See also Hickman v Taylor, 329 US 495, 
507 (1947) (“Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is es-
sential to proper litigation.”). 
 24 329 US 495 (1947).  
 25 See id at 509–10. 
 26 See id at 510–11. 
 27 FRE 702(c). 
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appl[ying] [ ] principles and methods,” violating Rule 702(d).28 
And repeatedly conducting a probabilistic test until one gets a 
desired result will generate that result with probability arbitrar-
ily close to one, so testimony that the desired result did occur 
cannot meaningfully “help the trier of fact to understand the ev-
idence or to determine a fact in issue,” violating Rule 702(a).29 
Finally, data-mined expert testimony surely fails Daubert v 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.30 Thus, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and of Evidence work together to enable a well-
prepared party to punish an adversary for its expert’s use of da-
ta mining. 
B. Expert Mining: Just like Individual Data Mining 
Hiring experts and directing each to conduct a single test 
until one turns up a helpful result has exactly the same statisti-
cal properties concerning test results as would an individual ex-
pert’s data mining. Suppose the question at issue is whether soil 
is contaminated; if it is, the defendant will be liable, and if it is 
not, then the defendant will not be liable. Table 1 concerns the 
repeated running of a soil test on uncontaminated soil. I calcu-
lated the table’s figures under the assumption that when the 
null hypothesis that the soil is uncontaminated is true, the test 
has probability 0.05 of finding that the soil is contaminated. 
This type of mistake is interchangeably known as a false posi-
tive or a Type I error, and the rate at which it occurs is known 
as the test’s significance level, typically denoted by α.31 The ta-
ble’s first column shows the number of independent trials of the 
test, ranging from 1 to 100. The second column reports the proba-
bility that at least one trial would reject the null hypothesis of 
 
 28 FRE 702(d). 
 29 FRE 702(a). 
 30 509 US 579 (1993). For example, there is nothing falsifiable about using a meth-
od that will always generate a particular result regardless of the underlying facts. See 
Falsifiability (Princeton University), online at http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/ 
wiki100k/docs/Falsifiability.html (visited Mar 2, 2014). 
 31 There is nothing necessary to my argument about the value α = 0.05, though it is 
commonly used. See David H. Kaye and David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statis-
tics, in Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 211, 251–52 
(National Academies 3d ed 2011) (stating that significance “levels of 5% and 1% have 
become icons of science and the legal process”). Contrast Posner, 51 Stan L Rev at 1510–
11 (cited in note 2) (arguing that such a low significance level is too demanding in prac-
tice), with ATA Airlines, Inc v Federal Express Corp, 665 F3d 882, 896 (7th Cir 2011) 
(Posner), cert denied, 133 S Ct 162, 184 (2012) (rejecting a jury’s damage award (in dicta) 
because the plaintiff expert’s damages estimate was not significant at the 5 percent level). 
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uncontaminated soil. With just 15 repetitions, the probability of 
observing a positive test exceeds one-half; with 25 repetitions, it 
is nearly three-fourths; and with 100 repeated tests, it is nearly 
certain. 
TABLE 1.  MULTIPLE DRAWS FROM THE TEST DISTRIBUTION WHEN 
THE SOIL IS UNCONTAMINATED AND α = 0.05 
Number of Independ-
ent Repetitions of Soil 
Test 
Probability of Reject-
ing Null Hypothesis in 
at Least One Experi-
mental Repetition 
1 0.0500 
5 0.2262 
15 0.5367 
25 0.7226 
50 0.9231 
100 0.9941 
 
Now consider the implications of repeated testing from the 
defendant’s point of view. She would like to obtain a negative 
test even when the soil truly is contaminated. Suppose the test 
is sensitive enough to detect true contamination 75 percent of 
the time. This means the test’s power is β = 0.75, and its Type II 
error rate—the probability that it will incorrectly fail to reject a 
false null hypothesis, also known as its false-negative rate—is 
1 – β = 0.25. Table 2 shows that the probability of obtaining at 
least one negative test result when the soil actually is contami-
nated rises from 0.25 with one test, to 0.5781 with three tests, to 
greater than 0.9 with ten tests, and to a nearly certain 0.99 with 
just sixteen tests. 
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TABLE 2.  MULTIPLE DRAWS FROM THE TEST DISTRIBUTION WHEN 
THE SOIL IS CONTAMINATED AND THE TEST HAS POWER EQUAL 
TO 0.75 
Number of Independ-
ent Repetitions of Soil 
Test 
Probability of Failing 
to Reject Null Hypoth-
esis in at Least One 
Test 
1 0.2500 
3 0.5781 
5 0.7627 
10 0.9437 
16 0.9900 
 
Statistical tests’ significance levels and Type II error rates—
for example α and 1 − β—often differ substantially. Figure 1 pro-
vides a dramatic visual perspective on the importance of this 
fact. In the figure, I use the same parameter values I used to 
construct the two tables above to plot the probability of obtain-
ing incorrectly helpful results. As the number of hired experts 
increases, this probability rises much more slowly for the party 
with the burden of proof, reflecting the fact that α = 0.05 is con-
siderably below 1 – β = 0.25. Test power is typically well below 
one for conventional significance levels like α = 0.05,32 in which 
case the Type II error rate will exceed α substantially. Thus, ex-
pert mining is likely to be cheaper for the party not carrying the 
burden of proof, which frequently will mean the defendant.33 
 
 32 Without delving into technical statistical details, I note that a test’s power, and thus 
its Type II error rate, usually depends on the significance level, α, that a researcher uses. See 
Kaye and Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics at 254 n 106 (cited in note 31). 
 33 Whether the defense case is more likely than the plaintiff’s case to rest on expert 
mining in actually observed trials is difficult to determine, because it depends on the 
share of actually tried cases in which the true state of the world is such that an informed 
fact finder would find the defendant liable. This share is difficult to observe or predict in 
the presence of party selection in litigation. See the discussion of party selection in note 43. 
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FIGURE 1.  EACH PARTY’S PROBABILITIES OF OBTAINING AT LEAST 
ONE HELPFUL TEST RESULT WHEN THE TRUTH IS UNHELPFUL TO 
THAT PARTY 
 
C. Incentives to Use Expert Mining and the Effects of Required 
Disclosure 
In Appendix A, I provide a stylized model of expert mining 
in the absence of required disclosure. The model shows that 
when the stakes are great enough, each party will have a domi-
nant strategy to expert mine: each will (i) sequentially hire as 
many experts as it takes to generate a single helpful result and 
then (ii) introduce testimony from the expert who generated it. 
Such an expert miner will always find a helpful result, so the 
parties will have spent a lot of resources hiring experts who pro-
vide zero informational content at trial.34 In this Section, I will 
address arguments related to expert mining in two scholarly ar-
ticles, one by Richard Posner and the other by Chris Robertson.35 
 
 34 As Robertson puts it, if all cases involved a single expert on both sides of an is-
sue, then there is probability one-half that one of these experts, chosen randomly from 
among actually testifying experts, would be correct, regardless of the true rate of error 
among experts in the population. See Robertson, 85 NYU L Rev at 189 n 63 (cited in note 2). 
 35 For additional discussion of issues related to parties’ ability to introduce experts 
of their choosing, see Gross, 1991 Wis L Rev at 1126–36 (cited in note 2). For models of 
the performance of jury decision making when parties control evidence generally, see 
Luke M. Froeb and Bruce H. Kobayashi, Naive, Biased, Yet Bayesian: Can Juries Inter-
pret Selectively Produced Evidence?, 12 J L, Econ & Org 257, 270–71 (1996) (finding that 
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Posner has suggested that this problem can be mitigated via 
required disclosure: “[L]awyers who call an expert witness could 
be required to disclose the name of all the experts whom they 
approached as possible witnesses before settling on the one testi-
fying. This would alert the jury to the problem of ‘witness shop-
ping,’” leading to the “reasonable inference” that a party inter-
viewing multiple experts has a weaker case than one using only 
a single expert.36 
Next, consider Christopher Robertson’s clever suggestion to 
use double-blind expert assignment in order to attack expert 
partisanship in general.37 One can regard Robertson’s basic 
scheme as a way to operationalize my assumption that any giv-
en expert testifies sincerely as to empirical findings. If Robert-
son stopped there, then, his proposal would not prevent expert 
mining. Mindful of this point, he proposes that each blinded ex-
pert’s report disclose the number of times a party has sought a 
blinded expert as to the issue in question. This report would be 
discoverable if the (subsequently revealed) blinded expert testi-
fied.38 
 
parties will engage in evidence mining generally but that juries might still decide accu-
rately); Amy Farmer and Paul Pecorino, Does Jury Bias Matter?, 20 Intl Rev L & Econ 
315, 327 (2000) (finding that jury accuracy is a fragile result); Andrew F. Daughety and 
Jennifer F. Reinganum, On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and 
Equilibrium Bias, 16 J L, Econ & Org 365, 388–89 (2000); Luke M. Froeb and Bruce H. 
Kobayashi, Evidence Production in Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Regimes, 70 Econ Let-
ters 267, 268–71 (2001). 
 36 Posner, 51 Stan L Rev at 1541 (cited in note 2). 
 37 Under Robertson’s scheme, litigation parties would contact an intermediary to 
request an expert report. The parties would provide the empirical question together with 
all information they wanted the expert to use, as well as an amount they were willing to 
pay per hour. The intermediary then would choose an expert from a pool of eligible ex-
perts willing to work at the offered billing rate. The expert would write a report answer-
ing the proffered question with the provided data. The value added of this procedure is 
that the intermediary would match experts to parties in a double-blind fashion, in prin-
ciple eliminating the basis for concern about partisanship of hired gun experts. Parties 
could choose to use the expert report or not; if they did, then the intermediary would re-
veal the expert’s identity so that the party and the expert could contract for testimony. 
Parties would still be able to use hired-gun experts if they chose to, including when any 
contracted blinded expert’s report was unhelpful. But juries would be instructed concern-
ing the difference between blinded and hired-gun experts, presumably providing a credi-
bility advantage to parties using blinded experts. Robertson, 85 NYU L Rev at 206–14 
(cited in note 2). 
 38 Robertson’s proposal differs from Posner’s in that it does not require disclosure 
for nonblinded experts. In fact, Robertson argues that required disclosure of the number 
of hired blind experts is consistent with existing Rule 26(b) only because of the extraor-
dinariness of using blinded experts. See id at 211–13. 
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While Robertson suggests that, in general, required disclo-
sure would be sufficient to eliminate mining of blinded experts,39 
this is too strong a claim. To understand why, observe that even 
when results from multiple repetitions of a particular type of 
test conflict, the collection of all test results together might be 
informative as to the true state of the world. The informational 
content of conflicting test results depends not only on the num-
ber of results pointing in each direction, but also on the test’s 
false-positive and false-negative rates. Even two test results 
pointing in opposite directions can be very informative, if the 
probabilities of false negatives and false positives are sufficient-
ly different. 
As a simple example, consider a test with a false-positive 
rate of 5 percent (α = 0.05) and a false-negative rate of 20 per-
cent (1 – β = 0.2). Assume we use Bayes’s Law to update beliefs, 
placing prior probability 1/2 on the event of correctness of both 
the null hypothesis and its complement.40 Now suppose we ob-
serve two independently drawn results from this test, one reject-
ing the null hypothesis and one not rejecting. One of these re-
sults must be incorrect, but which is the more likely one? Ex 
ante, false negatives are four times more likely than false posi-
tives. It stands to reason, then, that the negative test result is 
more likely to be incorrect than the positive one, and so our pos-
terior belief after observing conflicting test results should be 
that the null hypothesis is likely to be false. Indeed, in this ex-
ample, the posterior probability of the null hypothesis is 0.23—
less than half the prior probability.41 Thus Robertson is mistaken 
 
 39 Id at 212: 
Ex ante knowledge of this disclosure rule would generally deter litigants from 
iterative use of the blind procedure. For a litigant, there is little value in bring-
ing a favorable blind opinion if he also must disclose the existence of one or 
more unfavorable blind opinions; he would be better off resorting to traditional 
unblind experts or settling the case. 
 40 Treating the defendant’s case as the negation of the plaintiff’s has its critics. See, 
for example, Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 BU L Rev 401, 425 
(1986). I take this approach here only for simplicity of exposition. 
 41 Using Bayes’s Law, the posterior probability that the null hypothesis is true here 
is 
P Null|Data
Data Null
. 
Using the laws of probability, this is equivalent to  
P Null|Data
Data Null
Data Null Data Not Null . 
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in suggesting that there is “No Signal” sent to the fact finder 
when each party introduces blinded-expert evidence in its fa-
vor.42 At least for a Bayesian fact finder with a prior belief that 
the null hypothesis and its complement are equally likely, this 
claim would be correct only if α = 1 − β. 
This observation is relevant for expert mining with required 
disclosure. Would a party who has hired a first expert and re-
ceived unhelpful evidence still find it worth hiring a second ex-
pert when there is required disclosure? Possibly. A necessary 
condition is that the fact finder will update its beliefs toward the 
party’s position when the fact finder observes two test results, 
one of which helps the party and the other of which doesn’t. For 
example, consider a plaintiff who thought the fact finder (i) 
placed prior probability 1/2 on the event of defendant’s liability 
and (ii) would use α = 0.05 and β = 0.8, as in the example just 
above. Other things equal, this plaintiff would expect evidence 
from a second-hired expert to cause the fact finder to update its 
beliefs toward the plaintiff’s case (where the null hypothesis is 
the absence of defendant liability). Thus, expert mining could 
still make sense even in the presence of required disclosure. 
Whether such a plaintiff would actually use expert mining 
depends on more than just the direction in which the fact finder 
would update, though. Most notably, it also depends on the 
plaintiff’s beliefs about how many experts the defendant would 
use. Similarly, the defendant’s willingness to use expert mining 
depends on her own beliefs about whether the plaintiff will do 
so. And of course, each party’s incentives will depend on the cost 
of hiring experts, the cost of trial, and the stakes of the case. Fi-
nally, the parties will both engage in expert mining only if they 
have sufficiently different beliefs concerning the likelihood that 
 
With a prior belief that P(Null) = P(Not-Null) = 1/2, we thus have 
P Null|Data
Data Null
Data Null Data Not Null . 
In our example, P(Data|Null) can be shown to equal α × (1 − α), while P(Data|Not-Null) 
equals β × (1 − β). Given α = 0.05 and β = 0.8, it follows that  
P Null|Data
. .
. . . .
 = 0.23,  
so the null hypothesis is much less likely given the data than it was before we saw the 
data. 
 42 Robertson, 85 NYU L Rev at 217 table 1 (cited in note 2). 
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each would win at trial, given the profile of expert evidence they 
presented to the fact finder.43 
In Appendix B, I present another model, in which it is a 
Nash equilibrium for each party to do at least some expert min-
ing even when there is required disclosure. This result reflects 
the fact that required disclosure is generally insufficient to elim-
inate expert mining (at least when the fact finder is Bayesian, as 
in the model). But it is easy to show that even in this model, re-
quired disclosure together with a policy of excluding evidence 
obtained from an expert other than the first one does eliminate 
expert mining. If this proposition sounds trivial, that’s because it 
is: a party can’t benefit from the fruits of a second- or later-hired 
expert if a court will not admit that expert’s findings. So no par-
ty would bother hiring more than one expert in a regime that 
combined required disclosure and exclusion of later-hired ex-
perts. Of course, it would be impossible to exclude later-hired ex-
perts without required disclosure of the number of experts con-
sulted on an issue; adversaries would not know which experts to 
challenge, and judges would not know which challenges to sus-
tain. Thus, required disclosure is a necessary part of a combined 
mechanism to eliminate expert mining. 
One problem with the combined disclosure-exclusion policy 
is enforceability. Suppose a party did hire two experts and in-
troduced the second one’s results. If the party did not disclose 
the fact that it had hired another expert first, it might not be 
caught; so what’s to stop this sort of behavior? One answer is 
that the norms of legal culture might be sufficient to induce ex 
post disclosure compliance, so that few parties decide to engage 
the second expert in the first place. A second answer is that par-
ties would get caught sometimes; provided that penalties are suf-
ficiently severe and targeted at lawyers, who are repeat players 
in the courts, compliance might be incentive compatible.44 With-
out taking a stand on the empirics of these issues, I will point 
out that much of the discovery system operates on the honor sys-
tem. An observer who is comfortable with the existing system’s 
 
 43 This is just the usual point that litigation happens in economic models only when 
some form of disagreement or informational asymmetry exists among parties; otherwise 
the parties would settle and avoid spending money on experts, lawyers, and trial prepa-
ration. See Kathryn E. Spier, Litigation, in A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds, 
1 Handbook of Law and Economics 259, 326 (Elsevier 2007), for an excellent and com-
prehensive review of the literature on litigation and selection. 
 44 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J Polit 
Econ 169, 176–79 (1968). 
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performance should not be less comfortable with applying it to 
the disclosure-exclusion policy I propose.45 
In sum, assuming that parties and their attorneys would 
comply with it, the disclosure-exclusion policy would have sever-
al key features if implemented in a world similar to the one I 
model. First, the policy would preserve the incentive to hire the 
first expert when it exists now. Second, it would eliminate the 
incentive to engage in expert mining. Third, litigation would be 
less expensive, since parties would never hire more than one 
expert on any issue. Fourth, when parties did introduce expert 
evidence, fact finders informed of the disclosure-exclusion policy 
would be justified in treating that evidence as truly informative. 
While parties would not introduce unhelpful expert evidence at 
trial, fact finders would rationally infer that an expert-silent 
party had hired a single expert who provided unhelpful evi-
dence. By comparison to the no-disclosure baseline, the disclo-
sure-exclusion policy converts a system in which two experts 
might provide uninformative evidence into one in which fact 
finders would be justified in treating both expert testimony and 
its absence as providing real information about empirical facts. 
There remains the interesting question of whether it is de-
sirable to eliminate expert mining, given disclosure. I will as-
sume for now that it is. I address this question directly in Part 
IV.C. 
III.  POLICY OPTIONS TO DEAL WITH EXPERT MINING 
In the real world, there are legitimate reasons why a party 
might hire multiple experts to address a single issue. For exam-
ple, the first retained expert might have either delivered a poor-
ly written report or demonstrated that she is no good at articu-
lating her opinions orally. Excluding expert evidence in such a 
situation would undermine parties’ ability to prepare their own 
case, while serving no useful mining-prevention purpose. Thus 
in practice, any change in the Rules would have to be more refined 
than simply excluding any expert evidence when more than one 
expert has delivered a report concerning a test. It is easy to im-
agine widespread opposition—in the bar, on the bench, and 
among rule makers—to a firm policy of exclusion of later-hired 
 
 45 One nice feature of Robertson’s approach is that reporting of the number of blind 
experts hired would be done by the intermediary, so there would be no way to avoid dis-
closure compliance when a party used blind experts. Robertson, 85 NYU L Rev at 211 
(cited in note 2). 
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experts’ testimony. Moreover, as I discuss in Part IV.C, it is not 
clear that it would be desirable to adopt such a policy. Thus, I 
begin this Part by discussing how we might effect a policy cen-
tered on required disclosure; only subsequently do I turn to the 
issue of excluding later-hired experts’ testimony. 
New Rules language would be necessary to effect required 
disclosure. The most straightforward approach would be to 
simply add Rules language to require parties to disclose, via 
standard discovery, the number of experts who were hired as to 
an issue. A party could introduce her adversary’s disclosure of 
this number directly as an exhibit, or she could raise it when 
cross-examining whichever expert does testify.46 In line with Pos-
ner and Robertson’s arguments, a well-crafted cross-examination 
would undermine the credibility of the adversary’s expert evi-
dence when many experts are consulted. This would at least re-
duce the incentive to use expert mining. If all of a party’s ex-
perts (whether testifying or not) came to the same conclusion, 
then the Rules could allow the court to grant pretrial motions to 
exclude such cross-examination. To effect this or a similar poli-
cy, courts could allow parties to provide documents sealed for in 
camera review.47 
Another possible reform would require disclosure not just of 
the number of experts hired, but also of the contents of reports 
provided by a party’s nontestifying experts (including the con-
tents of any oral report). Such reports could be made admissible 
in cross-examination of a party’s testifying expert. Parties would 
know that the full range of expert opinions they had received 
could come before the fact finder. To the extent that attorneys 
are skilled in using language from unhelpful expert reports 
against the unfortunate party who received such a report, this 
policy could do more than a policy of requiring disclosure only of 
the number of hired experts. To address work-product concerns, 
parts of nontestifying experts’ reports other than the ones rele-
vant to expert mining could be redacted, and parties would al-
ways have the ability to seek protective orders pursuant to Rule 
26(c). And once again, additional provisions for in camera exami-
nation of nontestifying experts’ reports could be added if need be. 
While these reforms would discourage—and likely reduce—
the extent of expert mining, I have argued above that eliminating 
 
 46 There would be no hearsay problem because under Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(2), the disclosure would qualify as an opposing party’s statement. 
 47 FRCP 26(c)(1)(H) allows for sealed filing of designated documents. 
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rather than simply reducing expert mining requires excluding 
testimony from later-hired experts. If such elimination is con-
sidered a desirable policy, then perhaps the best way to effect it 
would be to require disclosure and to exclude expert testimony 
when an adversary both moves to do so and provides good cause 
to believe that there is no nonmining explanation for a party’s 
having hired multiple experts. Alternatively, the Rules could di-
rect courts to presume that expert mining has occurred when 
multiple experts have been hired, with a later-hired expert’s 
proponent given the opportunity to rebut this presumption.48 If 
preventing expert mining is a desired policy, then perhaps the 
best approach would be to expand judges’ discretionary gate-
keeping powers, however controversial these powers may be. 
IV.  FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
In this final Part, I discuss several further issues related to 
expert mining. First, is expert mining really a problem under 
status quo rules? Second, does my analysis apply in expert-
relevant contexts that do not quite fit the random-test result 
framework I have considered so far? Third, would it be better to 
eliminate expert mining or to allow parties to introduce whatev-
er evidence they wish as to an issue, provided that they disclose 
the number of experts they consulted as to that issue? 
A. Is Expert Mining Really a Problem under Status Quo Rules? 
An optimist might look at the paucity of cases in which 
there are accusations of expert mining and ask whether there’s 
any basis for concern. There are two good reasons why the an-
swer is yes. 
First, the incentive to expert mine is obvious. If the stakes 
are high enough, it will make economic sense for parties to 
spend what it takes to find an expert who is able to testify truth-
fully to a helpful test result. Perhaps one might argue that ex-
pert mining is unethical inasmuch as its general practice viti-
ates the informational value of expert testimony. But it would be 
a strain to read the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
 
 48 Note that when the question of whether a witness’s testimony was procured as a 
result of expert mining is murky, Federal Rule of Evidence 104 would allow the court 
discretion to decide these issues. 
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for example, to prohibit expert mining,49 and it doesn’t take 
Holmes’s Bad Man50 to believe that a client’s zealous advocate 
might find expert mining within bounds. 
Second, it is entirely possible that the absence of judicial 
outcry over expert mining is a result of its very protection from 
discovery. Expert-mining parties do not have to disclose the 
facts that indicate mining; even those opponents who are wise to 
the scheme can’t get the discovery they would need to unmask 
and counteract it. So there is no reason to think that courts, or 
even rule makers for that matter, should be aware of the scope 
of whatever problem does exist. 
B. Other Contexts in Which Expert Testimony Is Used 
I have deliberately restricted attention thus far to situations 
in which expert testimony involves conducting tests whose ran-
dom aspect can be repeated during litigation. There are, of 
course, many other important contexts in which expert testimo-
ny is used. Far away from the context on which I’ve focused, for 
example, is the testimony found inadmissible in Kumho Tire Co 
v Carmichael.51 Closer to my context, we find expert testimony 
by economists in, say, antitrust cases, where all experts might 
have access to the same industry data concerning pricing, produc-
tion, or product quality. These data are fixed at the time of liti-
gation, so there is no way to data or expert mine in the way I 
discuss.52 But that doesn’t mean that data or expert mining is 
impossible in the antitrust setting. Experts will typically use 
statistical techniques in these cases, and the nature of the mod-
els they estimate will be susceptible to individual data mining 
via sample selection or model-specification searching. Further, 
qualified experts differ as to not only the most appropriate sta-
tistical methods, but also the underlying economic models whose 
parameters should be estimated. So there will be plenty of scope 
for parties to engage in expert mining by hiring multiple experts 
to write reports and then picking the most favorable one. What 
 
 49 Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) Rule 3.3(a)(3) (ABA 2011). This 
rule prohibits offering evidence that an attorney knows to be false. But the evidence ac-
tually offered as a result of expert mining—that the testifying expert recorded a helpful 
result—is true.  
 50 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457, 459 (1897). 
 51 526 US 137, 153–58 (1999) (involving a defective-design expert who based con-
clusions on the technological features of the allegedly defective tire). 
 52 See Part II. 
06 GELBACH_SYMP_FLIP (JVB) (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2014  3:46 PM 
148  The University of Chicago Law Review [81:131 
   
drives the expert-mining process here is not random test-result 
variation, but variation in experts’ good-faith opinions regard-
ing subjective matters. Similar considerations arise in the 
medical-malpractice context that Robertson considers.53 
My analysis would need to be altered to accommodate con-
texts like these. But the basic points might carry through, be-
cause we can expect parties to hire as many experts as it takes 
to get a sufficiently helpful opinion; this is especially likely to be 
true in antitrust cases, in which the financial stakes can be hu-
mongous. Requiring disclosure of the number of experts hired 
might tend to reduce the egregiousness of expert mining in such 
situations, though disclosure might be less effective than in the 
repeatable-test cases. For one thing, parties could first deter-
mine experts’ publicly expressed views on, say, the competitive 
benefits and deadweight costs related to more aggressive anti-
trust enforcements, and only then hire the one who appears 
most likely to provide helpful testimony. That said, experts cho-
sen through such sorting will be vulnerable to a line of cross-
examination that focuses on their precase attachment to the 
opinion—in other words, an expert who appears to have made 
up her mind before seeing the facts of the given case might be 
less effective at persuading the trier of fact. A complete analysis 
of this modified expert-witness situation is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
C. Would It Be Better to Allow Expert Mining, given Required 
Disclosure? 
Given required disclosure, it is not at all clear that expert 
mining is a bad thing. The more expert opinions that the fact 
finder knows about, the more accurate her decision will be, pro-
vided that the fact finder correctly assesses the implications of 
the evidence she receives. Suppose a fact finder knows that two 
experts of equal ability have considered a question and are split. 
Under certain assumptions, the fact finder will on average be 
more likely to be correct if it can base its decision on the opinion 
of a similarly capable third expert.54 The informational problem 
 
 53 See Robertson, 85 NYU L Rev at 219–30 (cited in note 2). 
 54 I believe the following assumptions would be sufficient: the fact finder interprets 
each expert opinion correctly, knows the true rates of false negatives and false positives, 
and uses Bayes’s rule. To the extent that the fact finder does not satisfy these assump-
tions, more information conceivably could reduce the accuracy of its decisions. That issue 
is far beyond the scope of this Article. 
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with expert mining under status quo rules is not that the parties 
consult too many experts, but rather that the fact finder does 
not have the ability to take account of how many experts the 
parties have consulted. Given required disclosure, preventing 
expert mining via exclusion of later-hired experts is not an un-
ambiguously good idea, then. But it is also not necessarily a bad 
idea, either. Expert reports are costly to create, and it is possible 
that the marginal increase in the fact finder’s accuracy isn’t 
worth the added cost of the expert reports that will be written if 
expert mining is allowed. 
A further set of interesting but quite difficult questions con-
cerns how exclusion affects rational parties’ litigation behavior. 
Adding an exclusion policy to one of required disclosure will af-
fect the distribution of expert evidence across cases by eliminat-
ing what expert mining would exist under the policy of only re-
quired disclosure. That means the exclusion policy generally will 
affect which cases settle and which go to trial. It is not obvious 
whether this is a good thing or a bad thing. These observations 
indicate that a full normative assessment of the disclosure rules 
for nontestifying experts would require a comprehensive model. 
But the takeaway point is clear: it might well be better to rely 
only on required disclosure, rather than on exclusion together 
with required disclosure. 
CONCLUSION 
The probability of obtaining a helpful result rises quickly as 
parties increase the number of draws they take from the test-
result distribution. For that reason, parties can virtually assure 
themselves of obtaining helpful test-result evidence by hiring 
enough experts. Consequently, the expert evidence presented at 
trials conducted under status quo rules may have no informa-
tional value. As they stand, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and the Federal Rules of Evidence neither prevent nor even fa-
cilitate the ferreting out of expert mining. Proposals to require 
parties to disclose the number of experts hired would reduce the 
incentive to use expert mining but not necessarily eliminate it 
totally. To do that, one would have to marry required disclosure 
to a policy of excluding evidence obtained from later-hired ex-
perts. Since additional expert evidence is costly but also increas-
es the information available to the fact finder, provided that the 
number of experts hired is disclosed, it is an interesting open 
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question whether disclosure-exclusion or just disclosure is the 
better policy. 
